John McTernan’s Trident Case

10 years is a long time in politics

John McTernan was Political Secretary/Director of Political Operations for Tony Blair from 2005 to 2007. Later during the last Labour government, he was Special Adviser to Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence. Since 2010 he has been involved in Labour politics in Australia (Labor) and Scotland. Of late has been commenting widely on the emerging policies of UK Labour under Jeremy Corbyn. Late last month he took issue with Corbyn’s approach to Trident renewal in a piece for the Telegraph, If Jeremy Corbyn were a proper politician, here's what he'd be saying about Trident. In McTernan’s view:

It is an existential decision – about who we are and at the most extreme end whether we can survive as a nation. It is also one that decides what we can and cannot do for the next 50 years.

And it requires “a proper debate [which] “…is not going to come from Jeremy Corbyn”. As a better model he points to this passage in Tony Blair’s A Journey:

We agreed to the renewal of the independent nuclear deterrent. You might think I would have been certain of that decision, but I hesitated over it. I could see the force of the common sense and practical argument against Trident, yet in the final analysis I thought giving it up too big a downgrading of our status as a nation, and in an uncertain world, too big a risk for our defence. I did not think this was a ‘tough on defence’ versus ‘weak or pacifist’ issue at all. On simple, pragmatic grounds, there was a case either way. The expense is huge, and the utility in a post-Cold War world is less in terms of deterrence, and non-existence in terms of military use. Spend the money on more helicopters, airlift and anti-terror equipment? Not a daft notion. In the situations British forces would likely be called upon to fight, it was pretty clear what mattered most. It's true that it is frankly inconceivable we would use our nuclear deterrent alone, without the US – and let us hope a situation in which the US is even threatening us never arises – but it’s a big step to put that beyond your capability as a country. (Note 1)

McTernan goes on to describe how a case against Trident should be made:

… it needs to be located in a muscular defence policy. The reality of a non-nuclear Britain has to be planned for. That means realistic commitments to alternative defence sending – and not the politically lazy and untrue notion of pretending that you can switch defence to social spending. It also means an explicit commitment to sheltering behind the US deterrent within Nato – not taking the intellectually lazy option, in this case of pretending that nuclear weapons are immoral. And, it means committing to deeper bilateral defence relations with France, including a nuclear weapons treaty that would mean the UK had a backup to the US in case of the triumph of US nativism.

McTernan’s opinions are usually well-founded but on this occasion I find his arguments less than convincing. Firstly, he fails to point out that A Journey was published in 2010 and that Blair was describing policies being debated in the closing months of 2006, immediately before the publication of the White Paper Cm6994, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. At that time “the utility [of Trident] in a post-Cold War world” may have seemed “less in terms of deterrence”, but the last nine years have seen a considerable modernisation of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear notebook provides regular overviews of Russian nuclear forces, and the 2015 survey by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris states that:

The broad modernization reflects the Putin government’s conviction that nuclear forces, in particular strategic nuclear forces, are indispensable for Russia’s security and status as a great power. Maintaining parity with the United States is a strong motivation for this modernization, but the development of multiple versions of the same missiles indicates the strong influence of Russia’s military-industrial complex on nuclear planning.

and

Overall, the nuclear modernization effort will present Russia and the international arms control community with new challenges. Unless a new arms control reduction agreement is reached in the near future, the shrinking of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal that has characterized the past two decades will likely come to an end …

They go on to give details of the Russian ICBM, SSBN/SLBM and heavy bomber programmes to replace nuclear systems from the Cold War period and which have been put in hand within the limitations of New START in the years since Cm6994.

Secondly, the case against Trident which McTernan thinks should (or could) be made has some weaknesses. He describes “pretending that nuclear weapons are immoral” as a lazy option. Surely so would be “sheltering behind the US deterrent within Nato” when, as no doubt McTernan is well aware, Blair’s letter to President Bush of 7 December 2006 (extract below) makes it clear that the UK assigns Trident to NATO?

The UK’s giving up Trident would be to transfer part of the NATO burden of providing deterrence – McTernan does not dispute its necessity – to the US. He also seems to believe that, post-Trident, the UK would be able to enter into a nuclear weapons treaty with France which would provide “a backup”. France would probably see themselves as being in a very strong negotiating position were such an arrangement to be requested. McTernan sees this as a safeguard against “US nativism” – presumably he means an isolationist US turning its back on NATO. Oddly, he doesn’t raise the possibility of such a US government, unlikely though it is, withdrawing support from UK Trident. Amusingly, one of the intriguing aspects of Michel Houellebecq’s recent novel Submission was its exploration (frustratingly not sustained) of French nativism. And where would that possibility, again unlikely, leave us?

Note 1. This appears on pages 635/636 of A Journey. McTernan has replaced “non-existent” with “non-existence”.


ADDENDUM 3 FEBRUARY

Anyone interested enough to read this far might like to look at the speech US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter gave to the Economic Club of Washington DC on 2 February about the five challenges facing his budget. Two extracts:

Two of these challenges reflect a return to great power of competition. First is in Europe, where we're taking a strong and balanced approach to deter Russian aggression, and we haven't had to worry about this for 25 years. While I wish it were otherwise, now we do.

Another near-term investment in the budget is how we are reinforcing our posture in Europe to support our NATO allies in the face of Russia's aggression. In Pentagon parlance, this is called the European Reassurance Initiative and after requesting about $800 million for last year, this year we're more than quadrupling it for a total of $3.4 billion in 2017. That will fund a lot of things: more rotational U.S. forces in Europe, more training and exercising with our allies, more preposition and war-fighting gear and infrastructure improvements to support all this. And when combined with U.S. forces already in and assigned to Europe -- which are also substantial -- all of this together by the end of 2017 will let us rapidly form a highly capable combined arms ground force that can respond across that theater, if necessary.

Could David Miliband do a Boris?

On Thursday 7 August, The Times gave some of its front page and the whole of page 4 over to a “Boris bombshell” story, Boris Johnson having announced the day before that he wanted to stand for Parliament in the 2015 election. I have doubts as to whether Rupert Murdoch is particularly keen on Johnson. Certainly some of News Corp/News UK’s papers have their reservations. Later that day Simon Nixon posted a very critical piece, Boris Johnson Is Talking Piffle, on WSJ Blogs, and on 9 August in The Times, Matthew Parris, opinion columnist and former MP who has observed Johnson, commented about

… the Boris I’ve observed for years. He has some of the qualities of a great and inspirational leader — a political transcendent — and some of the qualities of a hideous car crash waiting to happen. 

I’m glad he wants to come back. He’ll be fun. He’ll enliven the Tory campaign, help in places, hurt in places, entertain everywhere and make little difference outside London. He’ll be a persistent irritant on the question of the Tory leadership, but he probably won’t ever be leader.

The leadership question had come to the fore in an analysis of Johnson’s strategy by John McTernan the previous day in the Scotsman, Riding to the rescue or a Tory car crash?:

The fact no-one wants to mention is that Boris’ return is predicated on a Tory defeat at the next election. … He can only be the leader if there is a vacancy. There can only be a vacancy if there is a defeat. 

… some argue that Cameron will win a majority, hold a referendum, win it and then gracefully hand over in 2018. If you believe that, do you mind sending me you bank details, your PIN and your mother’s maiden name. 

David Cameron is born to rule, and if he wins a majority next year – the first Tory majority in 23 years – he will enjoy every day of his five years in power. … If he can stay in power he will – whether an understanding with the DUP or supply and confidence with the Liberal Democrats. You will have to prize the code for the No10 flat from his cold, dead hands. 

No, Cameron goes when the Tories lose power. A triumphant Dave – in whatever form – kicks the leadership election beyond 2020, and then Sajid David will have shown us his paces.

But another politician (with grinning selfie) was spread over two pages by The Times on 7 August, David Miliband:

Rather a tale of woe:

Behind the smile, however, is a more fraught reality and fears that, despite moving to New York, Mr Miliband  remains a man at best in limbo, and at worst floundering. 

… Friends concede that it has not been an easy move [to run the International Rescue Committee] for the family. His wife, although American, was less than enthusiastic. 

… A friend adds that the two boys also found it difficult to settle. 

… The family spent the first holiday after the move not exploring the US, but visiting their old home in South Shields, his former constituency in the northeast. 

… Shortly after his arrival it was reported by The New York Times that “the plan is that with his international experience and gold-plated virtual Rolodex, Mr Miliband can bring in new sources of funding as well as raise the group’s profile”. Britain’s former foreign secretary has interpreted this job spec in a way that has increased tensions with some senior staffers at the IRC, his allies admit. 

… A couple of months after he started at the charity in earnest, The New York Times described how “some long-time IRC staff members responded to news of his appointment with a certain wariness, mainly because of Mr Miliband’s foreignness, his celebrity, his lack of experience running non-profit agencies and because they did not know what his management style would be.” 

… The US staff are said to find Mr Miliband aloof and arrogant.

And so on, with his lightweight social and public profile in the US, unlike Boris Johnson! And then:

There is no sign of a full — or even partial — reconciliation. Ed Miliband did not make a detour to see his brother during his trip to Washington last month. David Miliband did not see Ed when he was over in the Britain for a recent IRC conference in Windsor. In fact it is Louise Shackleton who remains the most unforgiving about Ed’s displacement of his brother, her husband. 

… Despite being in the midst of a complex and difficult reorganisation of a big international charity, as well as the usual problems of settling a family into a foreign city, Mr Miliband still pays close attention to British politics down to the fine details. “He knows far too much about canvass returns in Stevenage than he should,” one intimate says. It would be inhuman of Mr Miliband to want his brother to win handsomely, suggests another. In private, he is critical of Ed’s strategy and his narrow lead in the polls. He believes that the lead should be much greater given the collapse in most people’s living standards under the coalition government, and that the gap will inevitably narrow as the election approaches.

The article goes on to say that David Miliband is totally committed to the IRC and to speculate, rather unconvincingly, about how he might benefit from a Clinton victory in 2016.

An attempt was made to counter the “fraught reality” in the Observer on 10 August in an “exclusive interview” granted to Jon Swaine, David Miliband: 'I want Ed to succeed. I'm sure he feels the same about me':

… Miliband likes Italian food. His American wife, the violinist Louise Shackelton, prefers Japanese cuisine. Eating out is one of the best things about their new life, he said, denying rumours that they are not enjoying life in New York much at all. Soon they will be holidaying in Cape Cod. 

… "I'm absolutely convinced this is the right place to be for us," … "I wouldn't be happy if my family wasn't happy. That's a big thing. My kids are OK. Louise is OK." 

… Miliband said he was brought in to make the IRC "think, act, speak, like a $500m organisation, not like the much smaller one it used to be". Asked for a concrete change he'd made, he said: "We have galvanised the organisation to think ambitiously about its strategy for the future." Longer-serving IRC managers, apparently worried about risks to staff on the ground, reportedly fear creeping politicisation under Miliband, adding to the pressure they feel they are under to stay neutral. He denies any such clash. 

… He claimed that he doesn't follow "every twist and turn" of British politics, before saying he had watched the TV debate on Scottish independence the night before [6 August on STV, which would have been at 15:00 EST], and followed criticism of the wreath laid by his brother at a service to mark the centenary of the first world war. 

… In a telephone conversation later, following a report [presumably The Times above] that he privately wants his brother to fail, Miliband was asked [by whom, presumably not Swaine?] whether he thought he would be doing a better job. 

"Both Ed and I want the other to succeed," he said. "Strongly, passionately. And we also both work hard to keep personal lines open and private. I'm focused in succeeding in my job … and I want him to succeed in his job. And I'm sure it's the same for him." 

Yet on the subject of whether the Ed-led Labour party will win next year's election, he was not emphatic: "I think that it's really open. I think we can." Then he hedged. "I never say we will win. Because I'm a protagonist, not a commentator."

That there are parallels between David Miliband’s position and Johnson’s is obvious. If Ed M loses in 2015, and there is a leadership contest, the candidates would have to come from the Labour MPs who will be returned in the 2015 election. It wouldn’t be a much of a surprise to anyone who had read The Times article to hear that David M was looking for a seat (assuming the arcane rules and selection processes of the Labour party don’t make that impossible). And, no doubt one among several, Frank Dobson has just announced that he will be standing down in Holborn and St Pancras where he had a majority of nearly 10,000 in 2010.


UPDATE 20 AUGUST

An innovation at The Times which started this week is a daily political briefing, Red Box, sent by email at about 8 am London time. This morning it included the following:

LABOUR JOSTLING

Send David to Washington, Ed Miliband urged by MPs 

Labour MPs hoping to bring David Miliband back into the fold have an idea for his brother Ed. 

They say that Ed should make David British ambassador to Washington if he wins the general election, as reported in The Times Diary this morning. 

It would be the ideal way of rehabilitating him, paving the way for a later return to British politics after a spell in the US capital, they say. 

The idea of appointing David Miliband to the post was considered, then rejected, by Downing Street after the 2010 election. Sir Peter Westmacott is currently our man in Washington. 

The brother of the Labour leader currently lives in New York, where he heads the International Rescue Committee charity. 

As foreign secretary he forged good personal relations with Hillary Clinton, who is widely expected to run as the Democrat candidate in 2016. He would also be a voice trusted by the Obama administration in its final months. 

"What could be better?" a senior Labour politician told me. "It would be terrific for Ed to have David over in Washington, whoever takes over from Obama. And it would be a route back for David." 

Recently figures in the camps of the two Milibands have pondered how he might be brought back. They agree that if Ed wins the election his decision to stand against his brother in 2010 would be finally vindicated. He would be in a position to offer a role to his brother, and his brother should be prepared to take it.

UPDATE 30 DECEMBER 2014

David Miliband's situation has again been the subject of speculation  after an article appeared in the Financial Times earlier this month - see this post.  Keir Starmer has been selected as Labour candidate for Holborn and St Pancras.

El Niño and Ed Miliband

The invaluable Ballots and Bullets Polling Observatory at the University of Nottingham’s School of Politics and International Relations recently produced their 36th summary of opinion polling of voting elections since the last election:

When I posted about their 28th summary last September, I suggested that there were two axes of symmetry. One showed Labour’s poll rise reflecting the Lib Dem’s decline, the other axis the same relationship between UKIP’s rise and the Tories’ decline. This idea now seems to have broken down. The Lib Dems still seem to be stuck on a plateau below 10%. The Tories seem to have done slightly better in the last six months – if that’s because some UKIP supporters have returned home, then UKIP has nonetheless kept its numbers up, perhaps at Labour’s expense.

Once the European Parliament elections are out of the way, UKIP may enter a long decline until 2015. If it does, it will be interesting to see if that benefits the Tories, or Labour or both. And some Lib Dems may return to the fold, mostly at Labour’s expense probably. John McTernan is a centre-left commentator whose opinions are, in my view, always worth considering. (For example, see his piece for the Guardian, John Smith would have led us to a decent world, on the 20th anniversary of the Labour leader’s untimely death). In the Scotsman on 8 May, McTernan concluded that the 2015 election will be hard to call:

The Tories will prosecute an apparently simple argument: the economy is working, don’t let Labour wreck it. … For Labour, the nightmare is economic growth quickening, incomes rising swiftly.

But

The fear of the government will be that events beyond their control will overwhelm them. One of the biggest is an interest rate rise. Former chancellors Norman Lamont and Alistair Darling are both warning that there is the danger of a housing boom. Voices off are one thing, but what if the Bank of England decides to act? So many families are stretched financially that the smallest increase in mortgages could be enough to tip them over the edge. The other is an NHS winter crisis. This is what did for the Tories under Thatcher and Major – patients on trolleys in corridors would be disastrous for Cameron, as they would be the emblem of public service cuts.

And of course, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. But, as far as the NHS is concerned, the 2014/15 winter seems a long way off on a balmy day in May. This is particularly so when the last winter was so mild. To quote the UK Met Office:

Mean temperatures over the UK were well above the long-term average for all three months {December, January and February] with a mean winter temperature of 5.2 oC which is 1.5 oC above the average and the fifth highest in the series. There was a notable absence of frosts, and the lowest UK temperature of the winter, -7.7 oC at Altnaharra, Sutherland on 17th February was the highest such winter value for at least 50 years.

whereas the year before:

The mean temperature over the UK for winter was 3.3 °C which is 0.4 °C below the long term average. December was equal to the long term average for the month, January was 0.3 °C below, February was 0.9 °C below and at 2.8 °C was the coldest month of the season. Spells of notably mild weather occurred in late December and early January, and notably cold weather in early December, mid to late January, and the latter part of February.

The difference between the two winters comes out in the charts below (blue indicating below and red above average temperatures).

2013/14 (left) 2012/13 (right) Mean Dec Jan Feb temperature anomalies

Health planners are, of course, well aware of the effect of winter conditions on the demand for health services. For example, Public Health England have a Cold Weather Plan for England 2013, Making the case: why long-term strategic planning for cold weather is essential to health and wellbeing. This points out that:

Evidence shows that there is an increase in hospital admissions from cold-related illnesses, as the temperature falls … Admissions for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease increase as temperatures fall, particularly in those most socio-economically deprived. Hospitals and social care commonly face winter pressures. These often result from a high demand for beds and difficulties in discharging patients. This may be compounded by staff shortages due to illness. Cardiovascular, respiratory and infectious diseases with a seasonal increase, as well as weather-related accidents – contribute to raising the number of admissions. Prolonged in-patient episodes can result, either due to medical complications or a delay in discharging patients because of lack of suitable accommodation.

Also

Increased levels of illness due to cold weather can put a strain on local NHS services such as general practices and hospitals. There is evidence that cold weather may prevent people from accessing these services.

It would obviously be helpful for planners to know what the weather will be like next winter. The Met Office (in Exeter, Devon, SW England) has a team of researchers engaged on monthly to decadal prediction with one specialising in the El Niño Southern Oscillation, known as the ENSO. Just how the warming of waters in the tropical Pacific ocean affects weather in the northern hemisphere is complex with other factors to be taken into account, and is certainly a subject for experts. But in 2008 the Met Office did state that:

"We have shown evidence of an active stratospheric role in the transition to cold conditions in northern Europe and mild conditions in southern Europe in late winter during El Niño years".

So it was interesting to see a fairly high probability US consensus forecast for an El Niño event this year:

CPC/IRI Consensus Probabilistic ENSO Forecast

Not that it means any distinct probability of El N coming to the rescue of Ed M. Better to leave that kind of forecasting to John McTernan who, despite the uncertain start to his article, ended on a more confident note:

But while the big parties fight for tactical advantage, the result of the election will probably be determined by the two minor parties – the Liberal Democrats and Ukip. The Lib Dems’ fate is easily described. In 2010 Clegg sold sincerity to the public. He broke his word on tuition fees and broke his party. They have lost votes irreversibly to Labour and will lose seats to them and the Tories. Ukip is the wild card. It takes votes from the Tories – which is bad enough – but they are also dragging Cameron from the centre ground, which is worse for him. Elections in Britain are always won from the centre, but Nigel Farage has derailed the Tories. 

So, the centre-left is united behind Labour and the centre-right are split between three parties – the Tories, Ukip and the Liberal Democrats. This is a massive advantage for Miliband. Labour is currently on 35-38 per cent in the polls, a historically low level but in 2005 Tony Blair got a 65-seat majority with a similar figure. The reason? Ukip took 2,000 votes from the Tories in every seat. It was enough. No-one doubts Farage will raise that level next year. It’s advantage Miliband.

Scottish Independence: from polling to voting

John McTernan writing in The Scotsman on 7 March gave his article, What next for Scots after No vote?, over to an examination of the politics of Scotland after September’s independence referendum. He made the assumption that the No vote will prevail. Nothing in the opinion polls suggests he could be wrong, but I thought it might be enlightening to look at a recent opinion survey in some detail to see what might underlie the way it was reported in the media. For example, on 4 March the Daily Telegraph, under a headline, Independence support drops after George Osborne's Scottish pound warning, compared the latest Ipsos MORI poll with an earlier one and concluded:

Overall, support for leaving the UK was down two points at 32 per cent compared to an identical survey conducted in December, while opposition to independence remained unchanged at 57 per cent.

Ipsos MORI have made the details of their survey available to anyone who wants to look at their Tables of data which are broken down as usual under various headings, eg age, gender, social class and so on. (Pollsters tweak their sample (weighting) to match what they think is the profile of the actual electorate – such adjustments are small and their effect won’t be discussed here). The interesting thing about a referendum is that on the day the votes can only be YES or NO, the only other options being to spoil your vote or not go to the polling station at all. But drawing conclusions from the responses to a survey like this one of 1001 people seven months beforehand is more complicated and I’ve attempted to indicate why in the diagram below:

At the top are the responses of the 1001 and, at this stage in the referendum campaign, as well as Yes and No, people quite reasonably can be Undecided. Also, some of the Yes’s and No’s have not made up their minds definitely (percentage figures from Table 3) and similarly some of those who feel Undecided may, nonetheless, have an inclination towards Yes or No (Table 22). The arrows indicate the changes in opinion that these uncertainties could lead to.

The survey asked the 1001 people how certain they were to vote on a scale from 1 (absolutely certain not to) to 10 (absolutely certain to) – 12 didn’t know (Table 24)! There were 779 who were 10s and in the middle layer of the diagram these are again broken down into Yes, No and Undecided. Again, some of these people, albeit definite voters, may yet change their minds (Table 8). It is the nominally Yes and No percentages here of 32% and 57% which the Daily Telegraph quoted. Again there are some arrows to indicate how these opinions might change as well.

779 in 1001 voters definitely voting would be a turnout of 78% of the survey. The table below shows the actual turnout by Scottish voters in elections and referenda since 1979*:

So 78% looks a bit optimistic judging by the last 15 years of turnouts. However, as the diagram indicates, it currently appears that for YES to secure more than 50% of the votes in September, one or more unlikely events would have to occur, for example a substantial failure to turnout by those currently intending to vote NO, or all the currently Undecideds turning out and voting YES, or substantial changes of mind by those who currently consider themselves committed to NO.

At which point, back to McTernan’s article.


*Data up to 1997 from Wikipedia, subsequently from Scottish Parliament.